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Education is a key determinant of earnings, as several South African studies have confirmed. 
Years of schooling completed, however, provides an imperfect approximation of the effective 
level of education achieved, mainly due to variations in the quality of education received. This 
study addresses this issue by, for the first time in South Africa, incorporating quality of 
education in the modelling of earnings. Differences in quality of education are viewed as a form 
of pre-labour market discrimination. By decomposing the wage gap before and after controlling 
for educational quality, more accurate estimates of the true levels of labour market 
discrimination are obtained. The main hypothesis tested is that controlling for quality will 
reduce the component of the wage gap ascribed to labour market discrimination.  
 
The results show a systematic decrease in the labour market discrimination component with 
increased adjustments for quality of education. Almost half of the previous labour market 
discrimination can be explained by differences in quality, yet the proportion of racial wage 
differentials ascribed to labour market discrimination is still found to be significant. The clear 
implication is that current estimates of labour market discrimination are exaggerated and a 
more careful analysis of earnings is required to re-assess the levels of discrimination in the 
South African labour market. 
 
 
1 This paper flows from the masters thesis at the University of Stellenbosch by the first author 
(Chamberlain 2001). Financial assistance from the NRF is gratefully acknowledged. A previous 
version of this paper was presented to the Econometric Society of South Africa’s 2002 conference in 
the Kruger National Park and to the DPRU/FES 2002 conference on Labour Markets and Poverty in 
South Africa in Johannesburg. 
2 Genesis Analytics & University of Stellenbosch 
3 University of Stellenbosch 
  11. Introduction 
The burgeoning literature on the earnings function in South Africa has paid much attention to 
evidence of labour market racial discrimination, conventionally measured as that part of 
earnings differentials between groups not accounted for by productive characteristics. Yet 
several articles in this literature admit, as Jacob Mincer (1974) also did in his groundbreaking 
work on human capital and earnings functions, that traditional measures of education (years of 
schooling completed) are an inaccurate measure of the human capital transferred by 
education. This measurement deficiency is caused by differences in the content (e.g. subject 
choice and school curricula) quality of education provided. To accurately determine the 
contribution of education to an individual’s productive characteristics, it is necessary to find 
better measures of the human capital accumulated through schooling. This study takes a first 
step towards addressing this issue by, for the first time in South Africa
4, incorporating 
measures of schooling quality into the analysis of earnings.  
  
In the human capital model developed by Mincer (1974), earnings were explained as a function 
of acquired human capital which, in turn, was expressed as a function mainly of education 
(proxied by years of schooling completed) and experience. This model has since been 
expanded to include other factors that may influence earnings, such as gender and location. 
Already at the time of specifying the original model, Mincer acknowledged that differences in 
the quality of education received were a potential weakness and suggested that making 
provision for this in the model would greatly enhance its explanatory power (Mincer, 1974: 55).  
 
Adjusting the earnings model to incorporate quality of education also affects the measurement 
of the proportion of the wage gap (i.e. the difference in average earnings of two groups) 
ascribed to labour market discrimination. For purpose of this study (and based on the work of 
Oaxaca (1973)), labour market discrimination will be defined as the component of the wage 
gap left unexplained by differences in measurable productive characteristics of the compared 
groups. The main hypothesis is that taking account of the quality of education will reduce the 
component ascribed to labour market discrimination between whites and blacks, the two 
largest population groups in South Africa. This does not necessarily imply less discrimination, 
but presupposes that discrimination can affect the individual both in and before entering the 
labour market. In South Africa, racial differences in the quality of education received can better 
be considered as pre-labour market discrimination. Underlying the hypothesis is, therefore, the 
proposition that educational discrimination leads to disparities in the quality of education 
received which will lead to varying valuations of educational attainment in the labour market. 
                                                 
4 In a recent conference paper, thus far unpublished, Kingdon & Knight (2002) attempt a similar 
procedure, but using educational inputs at the magisterial district level as measure of quality.  
  2This suggests that labour market discrimination may currently be overestimated. From a policy 
perspective, this supports the importance of attention to access to quality education. 
 
2. The Model Set-up 
2.1. Specifying the Model 
In the simple Mincerian model, earnings are specified as a function of acquired human capital, 
which in turn is a function of education (measured in years of schooling completed) and 
experience. In a perfectly functioning labour market the individual’s earnings are determined by 
the value that the market places on the acquired human capital, because of the productivity 
associated with it.  
 
Thus human capital acquisition takes place pre-labour market and in the labour market (see 
figure 1 below). The pre-labour market period covers the period up until entering employment 
and includes primary, secondary and tertiary full-time education. The individual enters the first 
stage with a human capital stock determined by the unmeasured variable “ability”. As it is very 
difficult to control for the influence of this variable on the accumulation of human capital and 
sufficient data is not available, it will not be explicitly accounted for in this analysis. This should 
not detract from its potential influence on the accumulation of human capital. Ability should not 
play a major role in intergroup differences if it is assumed to be distributed equally across 
different groups, although it may account for earnings differentials between individuals with 
similar measured human capital. In the first stage, the individual is in full time education and 
human capital accumulation is determined by years of schooling completed and the quality of 
such schooling. 
  
The labour market period follows the participation decision. Here the contribution of further 
education (on the job training and part-time further education) towards the human capital stock 
gradually diminishes relative to that of experience.  
 
In both these periods, discrimination may arise. Usually in the earnings function literature, the 
effect of labour market discrimination is considered, but in South Africa a significant component 
of discrimination occurs in the pre-labour market period, inter alia through differences in the 
quality of education provided. The fact that both pre-labour market and labour market 
discrimination are strongly structured along racial lines makes it difficult to distinguish the exact 

































HUMAN                               CAPITAL  Individual 




















Quality of education 
Figure 1:  Human Capital Accumulation over the Lifetime of an Individual 
Two potential complications to this model in the South African context are that: 
  The level of education as measured by years of schooling completed (educational 
attainment) is not necessarily an accurate measure of the acquired human capital (due to 
differences in the quality of education received).  
  The market does not function perfectly and the market valuation of an individual’s human 
capital stock is often biased, due to imperfect information, discriminatory policies or outright 
bias on the part of employers (Fallon & Lucas, 1998: 12). 
 
One possible way of dealing with the first complication is to control for the effect of differences 
in the quality of education received on the individual’s level of human capital and therefore 
earning ability. The measurable variable years of schooling completed is adjusted to 
approximate the unmeasurable variable effective years of schooling received. The implicit 
assumption is that the latent variable effective schooling (and therefore human capital) 
accumulates on a continuous and linear scale parallel to the observable variable years of 
schooling. By adjusting years of schooling, an individual completing, for example, grade 7 may 
possibly only accumulate, say, 90% of the effective schooling of a standard quality grade 7 
  4year. In this manner, an individual may complete twelve years of schooling but only 
accumulate, say, eleven years of effective education. 
 
By controlling for the first problem mentioned above in this way, a clearer picture of the extent 
of the second problem emerges. Differences in earnings between two groups (in this case 
blacks and whites) can then be decomposed to distinguish between differences in 
characteristics (e.g. level of education) and how the same characteristics are rewarded 
between groups. This difference in reward to productive characteristics serves as an estimate 
of discrimination, as it is unexplained by measurable differences between the groups. By 
controlling for quality of education (and, therefore, pre-labour market discrimination), the 
estimate of discrimination arrived at is reduced to represent labour market discrimination only. 
Comparing this estimate of discrimination before and after controlling for quality provides a 
measure of the extent of the second problem referred to above. 
 
2.2. Modelling the employment process 
The process of selection into employment is often modelled as a binary choice model where 
individuals are confronted with the ‘choice’ of being employed or remaining unemployed. The 
assumption underlying such an approach is that all unemployment is voluntary (Bhorat & 
Leibbrandt, 2001b: 113), which is clearly not the case in South Africa. Bhorat and Leibbrandt 
(2001b) show that it is not appropriate to model selection into employment in this manner. 
Firstly, the individual can only choose to participate in the labour market. This choice will be 
affected by several factors such as the individual’s preferences, location, level of education and 
general circumstances. Secondly, the individual’s choice to participate does not guarantee 
employment. The selection into employment may be influenced by the same factors as the 
choice to participate, but also by other factors such as demand for labour and the 
characteristics of competing participants. 
 
Although only those in employment can earn an income, it would lead to biased results if 
earnings were simply modelled on the sub-sample of wage earners, who may not be a 
representative sample of all persons receiving education. Thus a fitted regression earnings 
function may confound the relationship between education and earnings with parameters of the 
function determining the probability of selection into the sample (Heckman, 1979: 154). In his 
seminal article on this topic, Heckman (1979) showed that this problem reduces to the omitted 
variable problem. To correct for the bias, we include the inverse of the Mill’s ratio (λ) as a 
regressor in the earnings function. Consequently, in order to control for sample selection bias, 
the modelling of earnings functions takes place in three sequential phases, modelling 
participation, employment and eventual earnings (of those employed) separately. Modelling the 
  5three stages separately also makes it possible to include explanatory factors appropriate to 
each stage, leading to a better specified model.  
 
 
2.3. Earnings Functions 
In its simplest form, the Mincerian model considers earnings as a function of the individual’s 
measured human capital stock which depends on education, experience and the proportion of 
time invested in human capital attainment after basic schooling (Mincer, 1974: 9; Fallon & 
Verry, 1988: 149). To illustrate the model proposed by Mincer the following variables need to 
be defined:   
Yt:    Potential earnings after t years 
r :  The rate of return (continuous) to investment in human capital 
T:  Total working lifetime of individual 
ht:  The proportion of time invested in human capital attainment during time t 
S:  Years of schooling (educational attainment) 
x:  Years of experience 
t:  Time in years 
Consider the level of income of an individual with S years of schooling (YS). Assuming that ht=1 
during schooling (for t ∈ [0,S]), the level of income at the end of S years can be given by: 
rs
S e Y Y 0 =       ( 2 . 3 a )  
 
In the post-school period, the ratio h is assumed to decline linearly with age and the lifetime 












       ( 2 . 3 b )  
where h0 is defined as the proportion of time invested in human capital attainment in the period 
directly following full time schooling. To simplify the calculations it is assumed that the return to 
investment in human capital is a constant continuous rate r. If we combine this with the 
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This equation expresses income as a function of schooling (S) and experience (x) and is 
known as the ‘standard’ Mincerian income function. In a similar fashion, the standard function 
can be expanded to control for other factors such as gender, location and sector of 
employment, but in practice the Mincerian function is still often used in its simplest form, 
controlling only for experience and schooling.
5 This is in part evidence to the intuitive elegance 
of the standard Mincerian function and its powerful explanatory capability, but also often a 
result of insufficient data to properly specify and test an elaborated version function. 
 
2.4. Modelling Quality 
There may be significant differences in the effective level of schooling received by students 
with the same educational attainment. One possible explanation is the differences in the quality 
of education received. 
 
Other than introducing quality measures as dummy variables, two methods have been 
proposed to account for differences in quality within the Mincerian framework (Behrman & 
Birdsall, 1983: 931; Heckman, Layne-Farrar & Todd, 1996: 564). The first method adjusts the 
rate of return to reflect differences in quality: 
Taking the natural log of (2.3a) we get the equation: 
rS Y YS + = 0 ln ln        ( 2 . 4 a )  
  
Let the rate of return (r) be a function of quality, so that higher quality education is awarded a 
higher rate of return. As functional relationship between rate of return and quality, Behrman & 
Birdsall (1983) proposed the quadratic form.  
()
2





                                                 
5 Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos (1992) contains several examples where Mincerian earnings functions 
were applied in their simplest form. 
  7where q is a measure of quality. This specification allows for the possibility of diminishing return 
to q (if rS > 0 and r2 < 0). Substituting this into (2.4a) leads to the final Mincerian equation 
adjusted for quality: 
( )S q r q r r Y YS
2
2 1 0 0 ln ln + + + =      ( 2 . 4 b )  
 
The second method uses a measure of quality to adjust the actual years of schooling 
completed in order to reflect effective years of education: 
 
Define effective years of schooling (S*) as a function of years of schooling (S) and a proxy for 
quality of education (q): 
( q S S S ,
* * = )        ( 2 . 4 c )  
Substitute (2.4c) into (2.4a): 
() q S rS Y YS , ln ln
*
0 + =       ( 2 . 4 d )  
One common specification of equation (2.4c) is S* = qS, where the proxy for quality (q) serves 
as a scale adjustment to years of schooling (Heckman, Layne-Farrar & Todd, 1996: 565). The 
second method will be followed in this study.  
 
Measurement of educational quality van be approached via inputs into the system (resources) 
or via the outputs (results). Heckman, Layne-Farrar & Todd (1996) and Behrman & Birdsall 
(1983) both defined their measures of quality from the input side, using a series of complex 
relationships between inputs and pricing equations. This approach assumes that the level and 
quality of inputs play a dominant role in the determination of educational quality. But 
measurement from the input side does not take into account the efficiency with which inputs 
are applied. It may provide a good indication of potential educational quality, actual quality 
achieved may be quite different. 
 
The alternative approach focuses on educational outputs, measuring what has been achieved 
without requiring assumptions on the efficacy of inputs (Archer, 1995: 6). But as it does not 
control for levels of inputs used to achieve the measured outputs, it can also not shed any light 
on the efficiency with which the inputs were applied and on how levels of quality were 
achieved. Care should also be taken to select measures of achievement that encompass all 
aspects of quality education. 
 
Which approach to use will be determined by the specific questions posed and data availability. 
The output approach provides better measures of quality (although data is seldom available), 
while the first provides a better picture of how quality was achieved. In this study, the focus is 
  8not on understanding quality as such but rather on obtaining a good indicator of quality to 
adjust the years of schooling regardless of how the levels of quality were attained. The output-
side approach, therefore, seems appropriate for approximating quality. Input-side methodology 
will also be used to transfer the proxy for quality (test scores) from the LSDS 1993 to the 
October Household Survey 1995 (OHS95) dataset (see below).  
 
To apply this output-based specification of quality requires a quality of education index (q). This 
is obtained using scores on the literacy and numeracy tests included with the South African 
Living Standards and Development Survey (LSDS93; see Saldru 1994). As the literacy and 
numeracy tests were included in the LSDS93 survey, but not in the October Household Survey 
1995 (OHS95), it was necessary to obtain predicted test scores for the OHS95 using a model 
fitted on the LSDS93 data. In essence, the procedure uses an instrumental variable, obtained 
from another dataset (LSDS93) and then applied to the earnings function dataset (OHS95) to 
calculate predicted scores.   
 
Level of education is the main predictor of these test scores (Van der Berg, Wood & Le Roux, 
2002), but as the intention is to use the quality measure to adjust the level of education in the 
OHS95, we could not include education as a predictor of test scores. To deal with this, the 
fitting of the quality function was divided into two stages. In the first stage, a simple regression 
equation was fitted, regressing education only on test scores in a single regression for both 
blacks and whites. Using a single regression for both population groups provided a way of 
standardising the residuals around the same regression function. In the second stage, the 
residuals from step one (the component of test scores not explained by education) were used 
to fit a more elaborate regression function (including factors such as provincial and urban 
location and gender) for blacks and whites separately
6. By separating the two population 
groups, it was possible to test for different influencing factors in each. In this way, it was 




                                                 
6 As the adjusted education variable will be applied in a regression function modelling levels of 
earnings, variables pertaining to levels of income also had to be excluded from the total score 
regression.  
7 Running separate equations for, for example, males and females is justified as they can possibly be considered as 
two separate employment markets. It is, therefore, not a question of sensoring the sample, but rather of using two 
different samples from two different populations. This justification cannot be applied to the population groups as all 
groups operate within the same employment market. To handle this properly a particular racial sub sample should 
have been considered as a censored sample of the population. Due to the increased complexity of doing this, it was 
decided not to apply the strict methodology and to run the different racial equations without controlling for censoring. 
Although this can potentially bias the results, this should not be an enormous problem as some degree of 
segregation still exists and the population groups, therefore, could be considered as quasi-independent markets.  
 
  9The regression function obtained in stage two was used to predict test scores for the OHS95. 
The maximum combined total score obtainable for the literacy and numeracy test is fourteen. 
Quality of education is not the main contributor towards the human capital stock of an 
individual, but rather has an enhancing or dampening effect on the ability of the student to 
absorb the educational content provided. To model this modulating effect of quality on the level 
of education, the predicted test scores were used to proportionally adjust school attainment. 
The choice of the proportion to be adjusted depends on the weights given to years of schooling 
and quality of schooling respectively. This, in turn, is based on assumptions of how debilitating 
or enhancing the effect of poor or good quality of education can be on the accumulation of 
human capital stock. As there are no clear guidelines for these weights, alternative weights 
ranging from 0 to 80% were tested as proportions by which years of schooling should be 
adjusted for quality. This also provided a simple sensitivity test for the choice of adjustment. Let 
x be the proportion (expressed as a percentage) to be adjusted, then effective education (E*) 
can be defined as:   
() ( ) E
Score









     ( 2 . 4 e )  
where x is the percentage adjustment allowed and ‘Score’ is the predicted test score on the 
literacy and numeracy test. Using the adjusted years of education (effective years of 
education), new education splines were then calculated.
8  
 
In the case of a 10% adjustment, the assumption would be that poor quality of education can at 
worst cause the individual to end up with 10% less than the potential level of education in a 
standard education. In the case of a 80% adjustment, the proposition is that most of the 
educational attainment of the student should be disregarded due to the poor quality thereof. 
 
3. Model Results 
3.1. Estimating the Quality of Education Function and Quality Proxy 
 
In the first step the level of education was regressed on the total score variable. The residuals 
represented the variation on test scores not explained by total education. Regressing the 
remaining explanatory factors on the residuals resulted in a function that accounted for the 
level of education while not explicitly including it. The results for the separate quality functions 
fitted for blacks and whites are shown in Table 1 and 2.
9 Several specifications of quality 
functions for the respective population groups were tested. The general-to-specific approach 
                                                 
8 The spline categories are kept the same, but the values within the splines are replaced by the 
adjusted values for years of education received. 
9 Detailed results available on request. 
  10was followed – modelling started with the most elaborate specification, which was then 
reduced based on statistical inferences. In general, the reduction of the models improved the fit 
slightly, but the coefficients on the remaining variables were very stable. This was encouraging, 
as the specified models seemed quite robust.  




tP  >  | t
Urban dummy -2.008035 0.790475 2.540 0.012
Location dummy:  Kwazulu Natal 2.060628 0.491822 4.190 0.000
Location dummy:  Mpumalanga -3.670158 1.510216 -2.430 0.016
Persons per room 1.313843 0.468802 2.803 0.005
Age 0.036102 0.009414 3.835 0.000
Number of Observations 297
F(5,292) 42.81





Several variables from different categories were tested for inclusion in the test score 
regression. Amongst these were household environment (including variables such as brick 
house, electricity, total number of rooms in house, number of people in household, family size  
and number of persons per room), location (provincial and rural/urban) and personal 
characteristics (age and gender). 
 




tP  >  | t
Urban dummy 0.397368 0.182768 2.174 0.030
Location dummy:  Northern Cape -0.641825 0.176625 -3.634 0.000
Location dummy:  Free State -0.923303 0.129228 -7.145 0.000
Location dummy:  Kwazulu Natal -2.123559 0.235941 -9.000 0.000
Location dummy:  North-West -1.720311 0.226019 -7.611 0.000
Location dummy:  Gauteng -2.160045 0.292306 -7.390 0.000
Number of Observations 1597
F(6,1591) 42.39






The first step in the next phase was to calculate predicted test scores for the OHS95 dataset 
based on the two equations estimated above. Once these values had been calculated, it was 
possible (step 2) to adjust the years of education variable for the measured quality of education 
received using equation (2.4e) above. 
 
  11As mentioned before, there are no clear guidelines to determine the magnitude of adjustment 
to be allowed, i.e. the weights given to years of education and quality of education respectively. 
Accordingly, calculations were done for adjustments of 10%, 20%, 40% and 80%. The 
remaining calculations were repeated for each of these levels.  
 
3.2. Estimating the Labour Force Participation Probit 
Both the participation decision and the employment phenomenon are binary responses: The 
individual participate/does not participate or is employed/unemployed. Although it is possible to 
model this type of variable using OLS regression
10, there are several reasons why OLS is not 
optimal for modelling dichotomous variables (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984: 11; Long, 1997: 38): 
  It violates the assumption of homoscedastic error terms on which OLS regression is 
based. This means that the estimates of β are inefficient and the standard errors are 
biased. 
  The value of the dependent variable is not restricted to the range [0,1], which makes the 
interpretation of predicted values problematic. 
  Linearity implies that changes in the independent variables have a similar effect on the 
value of the dependent variable irrespective of the current value. The sigmoid shape of 
probit/logit models seems to get closer to the true non-linear relationship between the 
variables. 
 
For the purpose of this study the probit method was chosen to cope with these problems. As 
the first of three phases in fitting an earnings function (corrected for selectivity), labour force 
participation probits were estimated for the black and white population groups using the 
expanded definition of participation. From these functions, Mills’ inverse ratios were calculated 
to be included in the employment probits fitted in phase two. The results for the respective 
participation probits are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
The benefit of modelling the labour market process in three stages, i.e. the ability to include 
variables that are specific to each stage, now becomes. Household variables, for example, play 
an important role in the participation decision but may have little influence on the probability of 
finding employment. In the labour force participation probit, household variables such as other 
household income per capita and the presence of other working age males and females, 
pensioners and small children were included, the expectation being that higher household 
income and the presence of pensioners and other working age males and females 
(representing other sources of income for the household) will reduce the probability of 
participation. The presence of small children was expected to have a negative effect on the 
                                                 
10 See discussion of the Linear Probability Model in Long (1997: 35) and Aldrich & Nelson (1984: 14) 
  12probability of participation for females. Other variables included were age, education (with 
adjustments for quality) and an urban dummy. Being in an urban location, being older and 
having higher levels of education as well as being male, were all expected to increase the 
individual’s probability of participation. 
 
The urban dummy was significant for both the white and black functions and showed a positive 
coefficient that was consistent across level of adjustment. This was in line with expectation, as 
individuals often move to urban areas in search of work and it can, therefore, be expected that 
urban individuals have a higher propensity to participate.  
 
The different sections of the education spline were found to be significant across both 
population groups. The only exception was the primary education spline for the white 
population in the case where there was an 80% adjustment for educational quality. For both 
whites and blacks, the coefficients on all three splines were positive, confirming the expected 
positive relationship between education and participation. In the case of the black population, 
the relationship seemed stronger for the higher education levels, whereas for whites the lower 
education levels seem to have a stronger impact on participation.  
 
All age categories were found to be significant for blacks, whereas only some categories were 
significant for whites. The results indicated a larger probability of participation (relative to the 
control category:  15-24) up until the 46-55 category in the case of blacks. For whites, age 
seems to decrease the probability of participation as negative coefficients were found in most 
cases.  
 
The female dummy was negative and significant for both races across all levels of adjustment. 
The presence of children aged less than 7 years in the household had a significantly negative 
influence on the probability of participation for the white population group, whereas children 
aged 8-15 significant reduced black participation. Winter (1998) found similar results and 
suggested that it is because black women stay attached to the labour market even through 
their childbearing years. Aggregating the genders could also have reduced the observed 
negative effects of children on labour force participation. 
 
The coefficients on the number of males ages 16-59 and adults older than 60 in the household 
were negative and significant for both groups across all levels of adjustment, supporting the 
expectation that other potential earners or pensioners in the household reduced labour force 
participation. The results for females aged 16-59 were also significant for all categories but had 
a positive coefficient. Once again, this coefficient may have been more illuminating if separate 
  13functions were fitted for males and females. Bhorat & Leibbrandt (2001b) found a strong 
positive relationship in the case of black females and a positive but smaller effect in the case of 
black males.  
 
Contrary to expectation, household income variables showed a positive (though very small) 
influence on participation. It may be more appropriate to look at ‘other household income’ 
(excluding that of the individual concerned) and not total household income as was done here.  
  14  153.3. Estimating the Employment Probit 
The next step was to fit the employment probits on the sample of participants using the inverse 
Mills’ ratios (lambdas (λ)) calculated from the participation probit to control for selectivity. The 
lambdas were significant in all runs, indicating that sample selection bias was a relevant 
problem. The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
In contrast to the probit functions for participation, household variables were not included in the 
employment probit, as these should not influence the individual’s probability of finding 
employment. Higher age and education levels should increase the probability of being 
employed, whereas being female will decrease it. In addition to these variables, some 
provincial dummies capture the effects of systematic differences in employment relative to the 
Western Cape.  
 
There were a number of surprising findings. The urban dummy was negative and significant for 
both races across almost all levels of adjustment for educational quality. The results seem to 
indicate that individuals with similar other characteristics find employment in rural areas more 
readily than in urban areas when they do participate, but that participation rates in rural areas 
are significantly lower. A more detailed analysis of unemployment and participation is clearly 
necessary. The female dummy was negative and mostly insignificant for whites, but strongly 
positive and significant for blacks.  
 
The coefficients on the education variables were significant for both population groups, except 
for primary education which was not significant for whites. For whites, the results showed a 
positive relationship between education and the probability of being employed. Surprisingly, 
however, only the highest education levels were found to have a positive effect on employment 
for blacks. Within the sample of participants, it seems that all those with less than tertiary 
education struggled to find employment. The sign of the coefficients for blacks remained the 
same but its magnitude increased with increased adjustment for education quality.  
 
The age variables were significant and positive for both race groups. For whites, the location 
dummies for four provinces were found to be insignificant, whilst in the other four provinces, 
the probability of employment was higher than for the reference province (Western Cape). For 
blacks, only the Gauteng dummy was insignificant with all the other provinces (except the Free 
State) showing lower probabilities of employment than the Western Cape.
11  
                                                 
11 The changes in the coefficients and significance of the Kwazulu-Natal and Mpumalanga variables 
for whites and Northern Cape, Free State, Kwazulu-Natal and North West in the case of blacks 
stemmed from their inclusion in the education quality function (see section 3.1). 
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  173.4. Estimating the Earnings Function 
In the third step, earnings functions were fitted on the sample of wage earning individuals using 
the lambdas from the employment probit (also indirectly incorporating those calculated in the 
participation probit) to control for selectivity. All the lambdas were, once again, significant. The 
results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
The basic earnings function regresses education and experience variables on earnings. Hours 
worked was controlled for by including a proxy of weekly hours worked. In addition, dummies 
were included to capture the effect of urban and provincial location as well as gender and 
union membership. To take account of systematic differences in earnings among different 
sectors and occupations, a number of sectoral and occupational dummies were included in the 
regression. Union membership was included as a dummy variable.  
  
The urban dummy was positive and significant
12 for the black population but insignificant for the 
white population, indicating that there were significant rural/urban earnings differentials for 
blacks but not for whites when standardising for other characteristics. For blacks, all the 
education splines were positive and significant with the expected increasing returns to higher 
levels of education. The estimated returns to primary, secondary and tertiary education were 
3.2%, 4.9% and 5.3% respectively before adjusting for education quality (Table 7). With the 
40% adjustment, this increased to 3.5%, 6.5% and 7.4% respectively. For the 80% adjustment 
level, the results showed a negative return for primary schooling as well as a big increase to 
the returns for tertiary education (the level of significance, however, dropped to 10% for the 
latter), but 80% may be an excessive adjustment in calculating effective education and should 
mainly be interpreted as part of the sensitivity tests. For whites, the primary education spline 
was insignificant. The secondary and tertiary splines were positive and significant and 
estimated returns were at 5.4% and 5.8% respectively before controlling for quality.  
 
The results in Table 7 show systematic changes in returns across different levels of 
adjustment, with returns to lower levels of education systematically reduced by quality 
adjustments and returns to higher levels of education tend to increase. Returns to tertiary 
education may usually be obscured by the varying impact of quality of education.  
                                                 
12 The Heckman procedure in STATA does not have survey options that take account of frequency 
weighting in the calculation of the t-statistics (as it does for the probit functions). The artificially large 
sample size created by weighting, therefore, causes all the t-statistics to be significant. In an attempt 
to get some idea of the significance of the coefficients, the t-statistics were also calculated for the 
unweighted samples. These t-statistics were included in the regression tables and will be used to 
provide some indication of the significance of the results. 
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Primary Education  -0.80% -1.29% -1.91% -4.09%  -16.42% 
Secondary Education  5.35%** 4.54%** 4.78%** 5.21%** -1.33%** 
Tertiary Education  5.79%** 5.22%** 5.56%** 6.30%**  14.64%** 
Blacks 
Primary Education  3.19%** 2.29%** 2.60%** 1.53%** -4.33%** 
Secondary Education  4.90%** 4.28%** 4.83%** 3.54%**  0.50%* 
Tertiary Education  5.29%** 4.92%** 5.54%** 6.45%**  18.06%** 
** significant at 1% level  *significant at 10% level 
 
For blacks, after standardising for other factors, location dummies were insignificant for the 
Eastern Cape and North West; Northern Cape and Free State had lower levels of earnings 
than the Western Cape; and Kwazulu-Natal, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and the Northern Province 
(Limpopo) had higher earnings. The results were consistent for the different levels of 
adjustment. For whites, dummy variables for the Eastern Cape, Free State and Mpumalanga 
were insignificant, Northern Cape had lower earnings than the Western Cape, and Kwazulu-
Natal, North West, Gauteng and Northern Provinces had higher earnings. Once again, the 
results were stable across adjustment levels. 
 
Most sectoral dummies showed positive significant coefficients relative to the reference sector 
(Agriculture). There were no significant changes across levels of adjustment. The situation was 
the same for occupational dummies with most coefficients both positive and significant relative 
to the control occupation, unskilled labour. 
  
As expected, the female dummies gave significantly negative coefficients for both whites and 
blacks, with much larger gender wage differentials for whites. Although, therefore, there were 
little difference found in the employment of white males and females, there seems to be some 
gender discrimination in wage setting, a finding supported by Winter (1998). Union 
membership was also found to be significant, with the positive coefficient for blacks 
significantly larger than that for whites. The wage differential between union and non-union 
  19members was estimated at 23% for blacks, constant across all adjustment levels. This is 
similar to the results of Bhorat & Leibbrandt (2001b) and Hofmeyr & Lucas (1998). 
 
The results on experience and hours worked were as expected, with experience significant and 
positive, experience squared significant and negative, and hours worked significant and 
positive. The coefficient for experience was larger for whites, with the increase in earnings for 
an additional year of experience at 6% compared to 1.5% for blacks. The coefficient for the log 
of hours worked was also found to be much larger of whites than for blacks.




                                                 
13 The coefficient for blacks seems to be in line with the estimates of Bhorat & Leibbrandt (2001b). 
The white coefficient, however, seems unreasonably large. 
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Table 8: White Earnings Regression
  21Table 9: Black Earnings Regression 
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3.5. Estimating Discrimination 
In 1973, Oaxaca provided a methodology to decompose the wage gap and to estimate the 
levels of discrimination in the labour market. Oaxaca’s decomposition is often used to estimate 
levels of gender discrimination
14  and in this study will be applied to estimate the level of 
discrimination between blacks and whites. 
 
After estimating earnings functions for blacks and whites: 
w w w b X Y = ln        ( a )   1 5  
b b b b X Y = ln       ( b )  
where  
Yb and Yw are black and white levels of earnings respectively,  
Xb and Xw are vectors of regressors for black and white earnings functions and  
bb and bw are vectors of parameters for black and white earnings functions, 
the difference between black and white earnings (wage gap) can then be defined as: 
b b w w b w b X b X Y Y − = −ln ln       ( c )  
 
Using (c), the decomposition can be done relative to black or white earnings levels. The choice 
depends on an assumption on which wage level will prevail in the absence of discrimination. 
There is no theoretical basis on which to decide this – the ‘index number problem’.
16 The results 
will thus rather be shown relative to both white and black earnings. The first expresses, as a 
proportion of the wage gap, the difference between what blacks are currently earning and what 
they would have earned had their characteristics been rewarded similar to whites. The second 
expresses, also as a proportion of the wage gap, the difference between what whites are 
currently earning and what they would have earned had they received black rewards for their 
characteristics. 
                                                 
14 Psacharapoulos & Tzannatos (1992) contains several examples of this type of application. 
15 In order to simplify the discussion we ignore the error terms. 
16 In his initial article, Oaxaca opted to use both these methods and interpreted the two answers as 
upper and lower bounds for discrimination. In later work (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1994: 8), he indicated 
that this was an incorrect interpretation and introduced a neutral benchmark (a non-discriminatory 
wage level) to get rid of the index number problem and distinguish between positive and negative 
discrimination.  
 
The original method (without the neutral benchmark) will still be used in this study: Firstly, the 
relative level of discrimination between the black and white population groups is of particular interest. 
Secondly, the latter method is not without criticism, as it requires quite strong assumptions and adds 
much complexity to the analysis. 
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Firstly then, the decomposition relative to black earnings levels: 
By adding and subtracting Xbb
)
w to/from (c) and re-arranging the following equation is derived: 
 
() ( b w b b w w b w b b X X X b Y Y − + − = − ln ln     (d) 
 
The first term can be interpreted as measuring the actual differences in endowment levels 
between the two groups and the second term as measuring the difference in the market 
evaluation of the same endowments. The latter term is used as an estimate of discrimination in 















    (e) 
 
A similar decomposition can be done relative to white earnings levels. 
 
Based on the earnings functions estimated above, the decomposition of the wage gap across 
adjustment levels is as shown in Table 10: 
 
Table 10: Oaxaca's Decomposition of Wage Gap (difference in log of wage) 
 
ooking at the calculations based on white means, the discrimination component of the wage 
hese results can also be presented as in Table 11. Based on white mean characteristic as the 
standard, the wage situation can be expressed thus: Mean black wage per month was R1 689, 
Discrimination Characteristics Discrimination Characteristics
None 42.23% 57.77% 53.61% 46.39%
10% 42.03% 57.97% 53.02% 46.98%
20% 41.23% 58.77% 52.41% 47.59%
40% 38.86% 61.14% 51.23% 48.77%
80% 23.63% 76.37% 36.64% 63.36%
Based on white means Based on black means Level of 
Adjustment
L
gap (i.e. without considering educational quality) is estimated to be 42%, cannot be ascribed to 
the fact that blacks characteristics are less favourable than those of whites. This is 
conventionally regarded as labour market discrimination. Adjusting education for quality, the 
discrimination component of the wage gap is systematically reduced from 42% to 24% with 
increased levels of adjustment for educational quality. Almost half of the component previously 
ascribed to labour market discrimination, therefore, could perhaps be due to pre-labour market 




  24compared to a mean white wage of R6  989. Without adjusting for education quality, black 
wages would have been R1 589 + R2 150 = R3 739 if blacks had had white characteristics. This 
leaves an unexplained shortfall (discrimination) between white and black wages of R3 250, or 
46.5% of white levels. Accounting for the quality of schooling reduces this discriminatory 
element only marginally to 43.8% if a 40% weight is given to educational quality. However, 
when the weight given to educational quality rises to 80%, the residual is reduced substantially 
to only 29.5% of the white wage. 
 

























0%  R1 589  R2 150  R3 250  R6 989  46.5% 
% R2 161  R3 239  46.3% 
20%  R1 589  R2 206  R3 194  R6 989  45.7% 
40%  R1 589  R2 341  R3 059  R6 989  43.8% 
80%  R1 589  R3 336  R2 064  R6 989  29.5% 
Even a  that th ts are ba
10   R1 589  R6 989 
 
These results strongly support our main hypothesis.  ccepting e resul sed 
n rather tentative estimates of quality, the indications are strong and systematic enough that 
he initial premise of this study was that discrimination is a much more complicated 
d operates on more levels of society than is commonly accounted for. Based on 
 absence of clear, tested and 
tandardised measures of quality, as exposed by its conspicuous absence from most earnings 
o
differences in quality of education received do in fact explain a significant part of the wage gap 
previously only attributed to labour market discrimination. But it is important to note that the 
effect of adjustments for quality of education are not very large, unless the weight given to 
quality becomes quite large (80%) – something which some may find less credible. In addition, 
the results confirm that even after adjusting for differentials in the quality of education, in 1995 





this, it was attempted to test whether controlling for quality affects the usual estimates of 
discrimination and returns to education in a systematic manner.  
 
The main obstacle to an analysis such as this is certainly the
s
functions analyses. At best, it is usually only mentioned in a last paragraph on shortcomings 
and suggestions for future research. Within the known limitations of the data currently available, 
this obstacle was addressed in an admittedly simplistic manner that cannot be a perfect 
  25rendition of the elusive quality. Yet it certainly provides good first estimates both of quality and 
of its effect on estimated earnings functions and discrimination in South Africa.  
 
It was shown that it was necessary to control for sample selection bias (coefficients on the 
verse Mill’s ratio were all significant). The three-phased approach was also vindicated by 
for quality showed two things: Firstly, the 
onsistency of the results across different levels of adjustment showed that the models were 
of knowledge by virtue of both its strengths and 
eaknesses. Acknowledging that there is much room for improvement, it provided an interesting 
in
evidence that showed that the same variables operated differently in each of the three phases, 
thus providing a more complete picture of the labour market process. For the participation and 
employment probits, most variables showed coefficients in line with theory and previous studies, 
and allowing for an increased influence of educational quality changed the coefficients in a 
systematic and expected manner. Where results differed from previous studies, it could be 
explained by the more specific approach followed in this study using the three-phased 
approach. The returns to education in the final earnings regression were also as expected, with 
higher returns to higher levels of education. In the case of blacks, all splines showed positive 
returns to education. For whites, the coefficient for primary education was negative but not 
significant. Although this requires more research, it may be interpreted as support for the 
hypothesis of Mwabu and Schultz (1996) that the returns to a specific level of education 
decreases as the proportion so educated increases.  
 
Repeating the exercise before and after controlling 
c
robust. Secondly, increasing the influence of quality systematically decreased the component of 
the wage gap ascribed to labour market discrimination. By controlling for quality, almost half the 
proportion of the wage gap previously ascribed to labour market discrimination could be 
explained by pre-labour market discrimination. A significant proportion ascribed to labour market 
discrimination, however, remained.  
 
This study, therefore, contributes to our body 
w
view of the labour market process, confirmed the general results found in similar studies and 
showed some first evidence on the impact of quality of education on labour market earnings in 
South Africa. Most importantly, it showed that it is necessary to rethink and revisit the estimates 
of labour market discrimination and to control for quality of education when doing so. 
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